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Abstract—Online Social Networks (OSNs) have rapidly become a
prominent and widely used service, offering a wealth of personal and
sensitive information with significant security and privacy implications.
Hence, OSNs are also an important - and popular - subject for research.
To perform research based on real-life evidence, however, researchers
may need to access OSN data, such as texts and files uploaded by users
and connections among users. This raises significant ethical problems.
Currently, there are no clear ethical guidelines, and researchers may end
up (unintentionally) performing ethically questionable research, some-
times even when more ethical research alternatives exist. For example,
several studies have employed “fake identities” to collect data from
OSNs, but fake identities may be used for attacks and are considered
a security issue. Is it legitimate to use fake identities for studying OSNs
or for collecting OSN data for research? We present a taxonomy of the
ethical challenges facing researchers of OSNs and compare different
approaches. We demonstrate how ethical considerations have been
taken into account in previous studies that used fake identities. In
addition, several possible approaches are offered to reduce or avoid
ethical misconducts. We hope this work will stimulate the development
and use of ethical practices and methods in the research of online social
networks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks (OSNs), often referred to as social
media, have rapidly become an integral part of society.
They are widely used by many and contain a wealth of
information, much of it sensitive and personal. This vast
source of pertinent information allows for innovative
applications of OSNs, and many of these innovations are
designed to benefit both society at large and individuals
in particular to identify possible threats to society or
individuals. For example, a study on OSNs can assist
in the identification of individuals who are inclined to
commit suicide or initiate a terror attack, thus enabling
a priori prevention. On the other hand, there are also
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many ways in which OSNs may be abused, resulting in
inappropriate or harmful actions.
The widespread use of OSNs, along with their po-
tential for beneficial as well as harmful applications,
promotes the study of OSNs and their users. Much
research clearly has legitimate motivation, such as the
development of new products and services, followed
by the evaluation of their acceptance and usage Other
research focuses on counteracting harmful applications.
In particular, it is important to perform high-quality,
experiment-based research to evaluate risks and the ef-
fectiveness of different countermeasures ([1], [2], [3]).
Online social network research often involves mea-
surements within deployed and operating OSNs, often
focusing on the most popular, such as Facebook.1 Such
operational research on deployed OSNs seems to be the
best - or even only - method to study important issues
which can help in the design and the improvement
of OSN products; in identifying threats on OSNs and
their users, including the design of defenses; and in
understanding social and economic phenomena.
Much of the current OSN research focuses on the
following two issues: the OSN graph and the OSN user
behavior. Research on OSN graphs analyzes the properties
of the OSN relationships graph of connections among
OSN users; this can be important for many goals, such
as designing a new OSN product. Research on OSN user
behavior focuses on typical behaviors of OSN users, which
can help design and improve products as well as study
security and privacy vulnerabilities and defenses.
The collection of data on an operational system, in-
volving data related to real users, raises ethical and
even legal concerns and dilemmas. [4] identify three
basic ethical concepts for research in humans in general,
and specifically in relation to the Internet: confidentiality,
anonymity, and informed consent. These concepts are at
the core of most institutional and professional research
governance.
[5] consider a related topic through their study of
usability aspects of systems and ethical problems of
such research; they, however, do not consider research
specifically on OSNs. Consider the ethical issues and
approaches, for example, in the field of Internet mea-
1. http://www.facebook.com/
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2surements, which involves real operation systems, similar
to OSN research (especially with respect to the OSN
graph). Most individuals performing Internet research
take privacy and security concerns into consideration.
Specifically, studies that expose traffic, e.g., to allow
further research on it, normally “sanitize” it by removing
any data considered sensitive; this is illustrated in the
Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis ([6]).
Similar sanitization of exposed data may be appropriate
for OSN research as well.
In this paper, we study the ethics of OSN research as
well as potential conflicts between ethical compliance
and attaining social benefits from research. Note that
OSN research tends to be much more active, with poten-
tial impact on both users and OSN providers, compared
to other forms of research, such as Internet measure-
ments. This prompts the consideration of an additional
ethical concept, which we call avoid disruption and waste.
Online social networks raise additional ethical chal-
lenges since OSNs normally do not allow such informa-
tion to be freely available due to the privacy concerns of
its users and the OSN terms of use. In fact, the ability
to share selected information with only a selected set
of peers (“friends”) is an important requirement from
OSNs.
As a result, much of the research using OSNs involves
different techniques to collect information, circumvent-
ing these OSN limitations. This includes “whitehat”
research for legitimate academic and industrial goals,
as well as “blackhat/greyhat” research, whose goal is
to extract and exploit sensitive information as well as
to actively connect to users, provide (fake) information
for different goals, and perform similar malicious activ-
ities. Such “blackhat/greyhat” research is conducted by
criminals, hacktivists, and even organizations involved
in cyber-warfare (terrorists, armies, intelligence and law-
enforcement agencies).
Indeed, one of the goals of academic (and some indus-
trial) researchers is precisely to study vulnerabilities al-
lowing such greyhat/blackhat research and then design
improved defenses for OSNs and their users. However,
for such research to be realistic, researchers must base
it on actual OSN data. This raises the type of ethical
problems we study in this paper. For example, in order
to study information leakage by corporate employees
in a particular OSN, researchers may want to employ
similar methods that industrial espionage attackers will
use. Similarly, studying the diffusion of information in
a social network requires the monitoring of many OSN
members.
An effective and widely used technique to obtain
information about an OSN and its users is to establish
OSN connections with many users, typically by creating
a significant number of OSN accounts under fake, non-
existing identities and using these to connect to other
users. The creation of such accounts has been studied
by several researchers ([7], [8]).
Fake identities are widely used. It is estimated that
more than 8.7% of the identities in Facebook are fake
([9]). These identities were created for various purposes
with both legitimate and malicious intent. Fake identities
may be completely fabricated, or they may be a clone
of an actual identity that exists in the real world ([8],
[10]). Recent studies ([7], [8]) show that users tend to
accept friendship requests from people that they do not
know both in the virtual and physical world; hence, it is
relatively easy to connect fake identities to real identities.
Obviously, the creation of fake identities raises serious
ethical, and even legal, concerns. Other techniques to
collect OSN data also raise ethical concerns. For example,
suppose a researcher did not use a fake account, but
her own account; would it be ethical for her to publish
information that other users shared with her? Is this case
a personal issue between the specific researcher and the
persons who decided to connect to her, or is it an ethical
issue that should be a considered when accepting such
a paper for publication?
In this paper, we investigate the dilemma between
two social goals: (1) the above-mentioned privacy and
security concerns, and (2) the desire to have reliable
experimental research on OSNs for socially beneficial
or at least legitimate goals, such as to improve OSN
products, services, security, and privacy. We explore the
need for OSN data for experimental research (Section
2), we evaluate the ethical concerns (Section 3), and we
consider some possible solutions (Section 4).
1.1 Related Work
In recent years with the increasing number of online
sources accessible to researchers, such as web blogs,
discussion boards, and online social networks, there have
been a growing number of studies on OSNs and users’
behavior. Several studies have investigated the ethical
aspects of acquiring and analyzing online users’ infor-
mation. [11] and [12] examined the ethical issues which
may arise when studying online Internet communities. In
their research, Flicker et al presented practical guidelines
for resolving ethical dilemmas in these types of studies.
[13] investigated the ethical dilemmas that arise when
researchers use web crawlers to collect information from
online sources. [14] explored ethical dilemmas, such as
the reuse of data from multiple sources, which may occur
when studying online virtual environments. [15] dis-
cussed the ethical considerations of extracting personal
information from public online sources for research pur-
poses. According to Wilkinson and Thelwall, researchers
do not need to ask permission from the text authors
when collecting public information; however, steps for
ensuring that the text authors are anonymized need to
be taken in academic studies. Subsequently, [16] investi-
gated what data should be perceived as private and what
as public; this enables researchers to determine when
their study requires an informed consent. Recently, [17]
demonstrated that ethics does not get enough serious
3examination in the field of social eco-informatics. Lucas
recommended that social eco-informatics researchers in-
clude more ethical deliberation in their research.
Indeed, there is a rising awareness regarding the eth-
ical concerns related to OSN research, but it mainly
focuses exposing a user’s private data. In this work, we
discuss ethical problems related to the methods which
are deployed when conducting research on an OSN, and
we also consider the potential risks and problems which
may result, affecting the OSN and its users as well as
possible third parties.
1.2 Contributions
This work presents the first taxonomy of ethical consid-
erations and problems related to the range of techniques
and approaches that are employed in studies of online
social networks. This significantly expands upon previ-
ously published works on ethics in OSN research; for
example, we demonstrate that OSN research can have a
detrimental impact not only on OSN users but also on
the OSN provider and even those indirectly associated.
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section
2 describes how information stored in OSNs can be
harvested for research purposes. Section 3 follows with
a discussion of the ethical and legal perspectives related
to research on OSNs. Section 4 discusses several possible
approaches to warrant the use of fake identities while
complying with ethical considerations. Section 5 illus-
trates how ethical considerations were taken in account
in previous research that involved fake identities. The
paper provides concluding comments in Section 6.
2 ACQUIRING ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORK IN-
FORMATION
With the exponential growth of online social networks
usage during the past several years, many researchers
have acquired OSN information for a range of purposes
(See Table 1), from studying the characteristics of large-
scale online social network graphs ([18]) to improving
road safety ([19]). The OSN users’ information can be
divided into two main categories: public and private
(see Figure 1). The public user’s information is data
that is available to all members of the OSN, while
in many cases the user’s private information is only
accessible to friends of the user. For example, Facebook
users’ personal information is accessible to other users in
the network according to each Facebook user’s privacy
settings ([20]). In some cases the user’s information
can be accessed only by his or her Facebook friends,
while in other cases the information can be accessed
by every member in the network. In order to acquire
OSN information, researchers have developed various
techniques that aim to collect both OSN users’ public
and private information. In this section we present the
different techniques by which researchers can acquire
OSN information. In addition, we also present ethical
issues which arise at the end of a study, after complet-
ing the acquiring process when, the researchers want
to share their acquired information with the academic
community.
2.1 Public Information
To acquire OSNs users’ public information, researchers
have primarily used online web crawlers. These web
crawlers can obtain the users’ information by using the
OSN’s application programming interface (API) ([18],
[21]) or by analyzing the raw data obtained directly
from the OSN’s web pages ([19], [22]). However, in some
OSNs like Facebook, it is not possible to collect users’
public information without being logged onto the OSN.
To overcome this limitation, researchers have created
passive fake profiles which are used to obtain access
to the OSN public information ([23], [24]). These fake
profiles do not initiate friend requests to other users in
the network and do not intervene in the OSN activity.
By using this method, researchers are able to collect the
OSN’s public information with minimal intervening in
the OSN activity and without accessing restricted users’
private information. The results obtained from using
these methods, however, do not give the researchers a
wider picture of the OSN, which is crucial for certain
type of studies, such as security and privacy studies.
Moreover, some techniques not implemented in the right
manner can abuse the OSN infrastructure and negatively
affect the overall network performance. For example,
using web crawlers, which initiate large amounts of
rapid page requests, can create an overload on the OSN’s
servers, resulting in interference with OSN activity.
2.2 Private Information
To acquire OSN users’ private information, researchers
have developed several techniques. These techniques
include requesting private information directly from the
users through applications and browser add-ons which
integrate with the OSN ([1], [3]); inferencing OSN users’
private information by analyzing information obtained
from their friends ([24], [25]); and even activating dy-
namic fake profiles, also known as socialbots, which
initiate a series of friend requests in order to collect users’
private information ([7], [8]). By using these methods,
researchers can obtain a fuller picture of the studied
OSN, including private users’ information. Moreover,
these types of methods are extremely valuable when it
comes to analyzing privacy and security issues in OSNs.
For example, by using socialbots researchers were able to
estimate the amount of private information exposed in
Facebook to malicious fake users ([7]). However, using
these methods can also influence the OSN behavior
and expose personal sensitive user information, such
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Fig. 1. Various OSN acquisition techniques.
as the user’s sexual orientation ([24]). Moreover, fake
profiles created by one research group may influence
the research results of another research group that might
treat them as real user profiles. Therefore, using these
types of methods should be done with great care and
with consideration to both the users’ privacy and to the
OSN’s infrastructure.
2.3 Sharing the Acquired Information
After the networks’ acquisition processes are finished,
many researchers want to assist their peers by sharing
their acquired datasets with the rest of the world. This is
usually done by anonymizing the datasets and upload-
ing them into dedicated websites ([26], [27], [28], [29]).
However, the sharing and anonymizing process must
be done with great care and consideration to the OSNs
users’ privacy. Using the wrong anonymization methods
can result in exposing the OSNs users’ private and some-
times sensitive information ([30], [31], [32]). Another
ethical issue which needs to be taken into consideration
is what to do with the acquired datasets after the study
is over. Do the researchers need to delete and destroy the
datasets, or can they store them in an encrypted manner
for further use? Each action has its own positive and
negative sides. If the researchers delete the datasets, they
fully protect the OSNs users’ privacy. However, they can
not use them for further studies, and other researchers
will not be able to compare their results to previous
studies using the same data. If the researchers keep the
datasets, they can jeopardize the OSNs users’ privacy,
but the datasets can be used for further studies without
the need to undertake the extensive acquisition process
again. We present our recommendations in Section 4 for
these issues.
3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Online social networks offer a vast amount of data,
useful for research in various disciplines for both com-
mercial and academic purposes. In researching online
social networks, a number of ethical challenges and
dilemmas are introduced with respect to the involved
entities. We consider the following as the entities that
may be impacted by OSN research: (1) the users of the
OSN, (2) the OSN operator, and (3) the advertiser/investor
in OSN.
In this section we identify relevant ethical issues (see
Figure 2). We then map the techniques in Section 2 to the
ethical problems that they pose (see Table 2).
3.1 The Users
Rightfully, ethical research considerations mostly focus
on potential harm to the end users, and this also holds
for OSNs. The main ethical issues concerning users
involve their consent to participate in the experiment,
and in particular, to allow any exposure of their private
information. Within online social networks, users share
lots of information with their online connections, and
may make decisions based upon connections of their
connections. This raises another ethical problem, that
of indirect exposure, i.e., exposure of a user via a con-
nection. OSN research may also reveal common user
weaknesses, which could then be exploited, and they
should be reported carefully to avoid being used against
the users. Finally, when users are unaware of an OSN
experiment, yet affected by it, there can be the ethical
concern of potential loss of time. We next review each of
these concerns.
Consent
A basic ethical question is whether all users should be
aware of being involved in an experiment, and if their
consent is required to participate in the experiment and
allow any resulting exposure of information. In many
types of research involving humans, it is considered
unethical to perform an experiment without consent.
Indeed, many recent studies involve those who have
explicitly volunteered, offering access to their personal
online information (e.g. [33]).
On the other hand, many of the experiments on OSNs
have not required the prior informing of users or the
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Various studies using different online social network acquiring methods.
Methods Studies 
Web Crawling Fire et al (2011), Fire et al (2012b), 
and Fire et al (2012c) 
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receiving of their consent. In many such cases the re-
search has significantly contributed to society, such as
identifying risks to OSN users and allowing the devel-
opment of countermeasures, and the actual damage to
individuals seems negligible. Can this justify performing
research without a user’s consent?
Indirect Exposure
A side effect of transitive trust is exposure of per onal
data to friends of a friend. In addition, two friends
may become connected who might not want to become
connected.
EXPOSING THE DATA OF FRIENDS OF A FRIEND. A
user’s consent, such as for a “friend request” or to
participate in research, does not automatically imply the
consent of the user’s friends. When performing research
on an individual’s data, the researcher also frequently
gains access to personal information about that individ-
ual’s friends.
CONNECTING 2nd LEVEL FRIENDS. Accepting a friend-
ship request implies becoming visible to new users. Two
users may not want to be connected via a third party;
they may wish to hide the existence of their virtual
profiles or want to keep the information that they post
private. During studies, researchers may connect individ-
uals profiles which would otherwise not be connected.
For example, consider a bot (attacker controlled profile)
that a researcher connects to, not realizing that it is a
malicious profile whose goal is to constantly discover
new users and to harvest information on these users.
This bot now has a second degree access to all of the
researcher’s OSN friends, exposing their privacy. Fur-
thermore, such a connection may also assist the bot in
finding even broader connections, which it otherwise
would not have the knowledge or tools to perform. For
instance, often to glean users’ information, researchers
resort to studies from sociology or physiology in order
to construct their profile in such a way that increases the
chances of other users accepting their friend requests;
the attacker does not have the required knowledge to
perform such a study on its own.
Exposure of Human Weaknesses
Research conclusions and results, if not disclosed care-
fully, can harm the user. Specifically, when conducting
research th t empl ys an OSN, the researcher may dis-
cover vulnerabiliti s pertaining to human weaknesses
or to the user-OSN interaction that were not known
before. For instance, if a researcher discovers that a
friendship request from a profile with a photograph of
an attractive female is more likely to be accepted by OSN
users, then he should be extremely careful to not disclose
this prior to notifying the OSN provider (see [7]). As a
countermeasure, the OSN provider could, for instance,
display a warning message to a user when detecting
certain profile properties that are known to be suspicious.
Wasting Time
The process of luring a user into accepting friend re-
quests may be time-consuming not only for the re-
searcher but also for the user.
3.2 The OSN Operator
Using the platform that an OSN provides for research
may stand in violation of the OSN’s terms of service.
This may further result in potential harm to the OSN or
to its users, e.g., due to wasted resources, exposure to
competition, or a reduced customer base. Several ethical
considerations relating to OSN operators are described
below.
Agreement Violation
Creating fake accounts often stands as a violation of
conditions of an OSN, which forbids creating more than
one account or using fake accounts. Fake accounts may
expose the OSN to lawsuits or harm its reputation.
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Fig. 2. Ethical considerations with respect to the user, the OSN, and the advertiser/investor when performing research
on an OSN.
Non-Coordinated Exposure
OSN platforms may have vulnerabilities and can even
be used as a vector in launching attacks, thus harm-
ing users, hurting other networks and services on the
Internet, and exhausting the resources of the OSN. For
instance, [34] discovered a new attack: the friend-in-the-
middle attack that can be used to harvest social data
in an automated fashion. When conducting a study on
online social networks, researchers often discover such
vulnerabilities. It is important, therefore, to establish
a procedure whereby the researchers can publish the
OSN vulnerabilities and attacks and take the necessary
precautions, e.g., contacting the OSN and allowing it to
patch the exploit to prevent abuse by malicious parties.
If a vulnerability is exposed without coordination with
the OSN, it may be subsequently exploited by attackers
to compromise the OSN and its users.
As an example, recently [35] showed that malicious
users can take control of the social network visitors
by remotely manipulating their browsers through legiti-
mate web control functionality, e.g., using image-loading
HTML tags. They also demonstrated that Facebook users
can be exploited as a vector in launching a denial of
service attacks. Clickjack attacks can hijack users’ web
sessions ([36]) if the OSN does not employ sufficient
countermeasures.
It is important to emphasize that research on OSNs is
clearly valuable and should be encouraged since weak-
nesses as described above may be exploited by malicious
attackers without the awareness of the OSN, the users,
or the research community. Furthermore, research allows
the development of patches and countermeasures to
preventing the vulnerabilities from being exploited.
Waste of Resources
Creating fake profiles consumes resources on the OSN,
including storage, communication, and processing.
Impact on Statistics
Fake accounts bias statistics and may provide misleading
information on trends, resulting in wide-ranging com-
mercial implications.
Exposure of Sensitive Information
While running a study, researchers may discover sensi-
tive information pertaining to the OSN, such as the way
its algorithms work. Exposure of this information may
benefit the OSN’s competitors and consequently harm
the OSN and produce a negative commercial impact.
3.3 The Advertiser/Investor
Fake accounts, created during a research study, may
influence the perceived popularity of an online social
network; that is, the experiment may increase the OSN’s
share value through impressing the shareholders, or it
may influence the effectiveness of advertising on the
OSN, which may not translate into a profitable and
sustainable business. According to the analytics service
of Limited Run, an online shopping platform provider,
the ad system on Facebook is not reliable, and 80% of
the ad clicks come from fake accounts or bots, which
drive up the advertising costs ([37]). Furthermore, if
the investor (or the advertiser) pays per profile, fake
accounts artificially inflate the value of the OSN. For
instance, in August 2012 Facebook was reported to have
more than 83 million fake profiles, which are about 8.7%
of the total number of profiles ([9]); this indicates a
notable growth of fake accounts from 6.0% in March
2012.
4 ETHICAL RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS
In the previous section, we discussed a large set of
ethical issues with OSN research methodologies. In this
section, we explore different solutions, balancing the
ethical principles of confidentiality, anonymity, informed
consent, and avoidance of disruption and waste, with the
benefits from experimental research on deployed OSNs.
The ethical concerns presented in Section 3 can be
divided among concerns related to the harvesting of data
from the OSN; concerns related to the exposure of data;
concerns about the impact on the structure, availability, and
security of the OSN; and finally concerns about the conduct
of researchers. We discuss each of these sets in the follow-
ing subsections; before that, in the next subsection, we
discuss the specific issue of consent.
7TABLE 2
Mapping between the ethical considerations and the research methods deployed for studies on OSNs.
Method Studies Method Studies 
Web Crawling Fire et al. (2011), Fire et al. (2012b), 
and Fire et al. (2012c) 
 
Passive Fake Profiles Jernigan and Mistree (2009), 
and Fire et al. (2013) 
API Crawler Mislove et al. (2007), Kwak et al. (2010), 
and Pontes et al. (2012) 
By Agreement Altshuler et al. (2012) 
Active Fake Profiles (Socialbots) Boshmaf et al. (2011) and Elishar et al. (2012) 
Third Party Application Fir  et al. (2012a) and Rahman et al. (2012a) 
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4.1 Consent
We begin with some general recommendations, observa-
tions, and proposals.
We first discuss the informed consent concern and pos-
sible remedies. Obtaining user consent in OSN research
has two main challenges: (1) researchers may be unable
to know the real age of the user in order to verify that
the user is of age (for informed consent), and (2) the very
awareness of having informed consent may influence a
user’s behavior, impacting the subsequent research on
user behavior itself.
We do not know of a truly reliable solution to the age
problem since many OSNs only allow adult users, yet
many under age users register anyway, simply providing
an incorrect age. We believe this issue is not specific to
research, as this problem relates to the actual provision
of OSN services; therefore it is reasonable to ignore this
concern and for researchers to use the stated age of the
user (usually available).
The user-awareness problem is much more severe
for research related to user behavior. We suggest two
solutions:
Long-Term Research.
A user’s awareness of having been measured in some
experiment is quickly eroded after using a system for
some “real” purpose. Hence, the effect of user awareness
can be minimal in research that is long term. This was
confirmed by [38] and used in experiments in secure
usability.
Post-Research Informing/Compensating.
Another option is to inform users of their involvement
in research after the measurements have been completed,
even though the users did not express their (informed)
consent. It may be appropriate to also offer some token
of compensation as well as an explanation of the need
to use this method (instead of informed consent) and to
emphasize the social value of the research.
This is clearly not as ethical as proper informed con-
sent. However, this method may still have some advan-
tages, in particular: (1) users have the ability to provide
feedback, providing some indication of the amount of
harm, if any, that they have experienced, and (2) this
provides a negative training function, helping users to
become more savvy at detecting OSN fraud; see [38].
4.2 Harvesting Process
As described in Section 3, the harvesting process can
affect OSN performance, influence an OSN’s reputation,
and threaten users’ privacy. The harvesting is performed
directly by crawlers or indirectly by fake identities. One
8of the first ways to reduce the ethical concerns related to
harvesting is to improve the sharing of datasets among
the researchers such that not every researcher will har-
vest his own data. Currently, the information retrieval
community has created many datasets that are being
shared by all the researchers in the community ([39]).
The social network research community should adopt
this strategy in order to reduce harvesting as much as
possible. Alternatively, perhaps the social network opera-
tors should create datasets specifically for researchers (“if
you cannot fight them, join them”) after informing their
users about the new policy. The social network operators
are in a better position to apply advanced anonymization
techniques than any small research group.
4.3 Research Results
Research results may influence both the users and op-
erators of OSNs as described previously. As with many
types of research, vulnerabilities are routinely discovered
and often disclosed before the operators have had the
chance to patch up the problem. This issue is exacerbated
with respect to OSN platforms and their users since
each weakness has the potential to affect an enormous
number of parties, with detrimental results. Due to the
importance of the potential data exposure, we recom-
mend setting up a Coordinated Emergency Response
Team (CERT) for vulnerability disclosures. Such an entity
will allow all of the involved parties to be quickly noti-
fied, and it will give them an opportunity to patch the
problem before the exploit becomes public. Researchers
should also suggests countermeasures to the attack and
inform the operators accordingly.
Experiments that involve human subjects should re-
quire a lengthy approval process, whereby it is verified
that the research can cause no harm. Since OSN research
involves human subjects, or more specifically their data,
an approval process should be required for cases in
which new research methods are being implemented.
A potential reaction of the OSN operator, e.g., due
to concern for legal actions against it, may be to pre-
vent any kind of research on the OSN. However, we
caution against this reaction, noting that such a security
by obscurity is risky and can endanger both the users
of the OSN and the OSN platform (as well as other
potential third parties). Vulnerabilities may be discov-
ered and abused by malicious attackers, instead of used
beneficially by legitimate researchers. Attackers do not
publish the vulnerabilities and attacks; researchers, on
the other hand, create awareness and provide solutions
to these vulnerabilities. Therefore, we recommend that
the OSN operators address these issues and recognize
the legitimate need for research to provide appropriate,
beneficial contributions.
4.4 Influence on the Network
In general, OSN operators need to accept the fact that
researchers will undoubtedly continue to create fake
profiles, and the operators’ algorithms will never be able
to detect all of them. Therefore, the OSN operator should
allow fake profiles to be created, but it should also offer
a specified procedure whereby a researcher can notify
the OSN and request approval (possibly anonymously)
for introducing profiles that are fake and dedicated to a
specific study, indicating relevant information such as the
duration of the study and purpose of the research. The
OSN should have an approval (or alternately, rejection)
procedure for each profile, along with an appropriate
method to notify the researcher. The OSN may also
request an approval or certificate from the researcher,
stating that the study is “ethical.” It is important to note
that the proposed procedure would allow researchers to
spend fewer resources on having to generate fake profiles
that cannot be detected by the OSN operator.
We recommend that generally the OSN should allow
the requests since good research will help protect the
OSN platform and its users. However, it may be reason-
able to limit the number of fake profiles to some pre-
determined threshold at any one time.
4.5 Researchers’ Conduct
We recommend that researchers use the online social
networks’ APIs when possible, and then resort to fake
passive profiles (instead of active) if needed. The identi-
fiers of the profile (e.g., a photo) should not expose the
identity of the individual. When the study concludes,
the researcher should remove the fake profile and, if
possible, inform users connected to that profile that it
was a fake profile for research purposes. When possible,
the researcher should also provide information and token
compensation, and allow users to provide feedback. This
has multiple benefits: (1) fairness to users; (2) better
awareness of the possible harm to users, allowing im-
proved ethical decisions in future research; (3) reduction
in harm to users; (4) potentially highly significant nega-
tive training to users, teaching them to be more cautious
and to be able to identify fake identities in the future
(see [38]).
Researchers should use cryptographic and other tech-
niques for anonymization of the data as well as for confi-
dentiality. The researchers should handle the study data,
as well as the findings, with great care. Following the
research, the data should be removed, or if it is required
for future research, it should be stored encrypted. When
sharing the data, we recommend applying appropriate
anonymization techniques which remove all identifying
data that can leak information when combined with
other sources. See ([32]) for further information on such
deanonymisation attacks. When transferring the data
over the network and when accessing the OSN, en-
cryption should be used. When conducting the study,
the researchers should also consider the load on the
OSN and the overhead to users. Finally, the researchers
should maintain precise and accurate records of the data
collected, the profiles created, the people involved in
9research, and any other pertinent information. This must
be preserved in a secure manner.
5 PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND ETHICAL CON-
SIDERATIONS
In this section, we will use previous studies that em-
ployed fake identities to illustrate that it is possible to
achieve similar research results, but with lower impact
to the OSN members’ privacy and to the OSN operator
resources.
[23] presented a method for mining an organization’s
topology through the use of passive fake identities which
collected employees’ public information from their Face-
book profiles. [8] employed active fake identities to
achieve the same goal of mining organizational topol-
ogy. [8] initiated friend requests to Facebook users who
worked in a targeted organization. Upon accepting these
friend requests, users unknowingly exposed informa-
tion about themselves and about their workplace. This
technique was tested on two real organizations and
successfully infiltrated both. Compared to the passive
fake identity method, the technique utilizing active fake
identities, was able to discover up to 13.55% more em-
ployees and up to 18.29% more informal organizational
links. However, similar results were achieved from both
studies when identifying leadership roles using differ-
ent centrality measures. Hence, it is possible to infer
leadership roles without the need to employ active fake
profiles, which can compromise the OSN users’ privacy
and impact the OSN operator resources.
[2] presented a novel method for the detection of
fake identities in OSNs by using only the social net-
work’s own topological features. Reliance on these fea-
tures alone ensures that the proposed method is generic
enough to be applied on a range of social networks.
In order to train a machine learning classier, training
had to be created and collected. The training set had
to include labeled fake identities. One way to create a
training set is to add fake identities to an OSN and then
collect the modified network as a labeled training set.
To avoid modifying the OSN itself, which will create
a negative impact on the OSN operator, a different
approach was taken. To create positive examples for the
classifiers, Fire et al developed a code which simulated
the infiltration of a single fake identity (or a group of fake
identities) to social networks. For each social network,
the simulator loaded the topology graph and inserted 100
new nodes, which represented 100 fake identities. The
insertion process of each fake identity into the graph was
done by simulating a series of “follow” requests sent to
random users in the network. Each fake user had a limit
on the number of friend requests in order to comply with
a reality in which many social networks limit the number
of user requests allowed for new members (exactly for
the purpose of blocking spammers and socialbots).
6 CONCLUSIONS
Research involving the operation of widely-used online
social networks the behavior of OSN users, is vital to
the design of improved OSNs, OSN applications, and es-
pecially OSN privacy and security mechanisms. Indeed,
research on online social networks and OSN data can be
useful in various research disciplines, such as the study
of social behavior and the design of secure and usable
social networks. It can also have value and applications
in real life and; for example, it can facilitate detection
and a priori prevention of terror attacks, theft, coercion,
and other critical situation.
Many commonly used research techniques, however,
raise ethical concerns, which are rarely even considered
by researchers or the community at large. For instance,
such research can jeopardize users’ privacy as well as
expose potential vulnerabilities of the OSN platform to
abuse by malicious attackers. A trivial solution is to
limit such research to use on simulated environments.
However, in order for research on OSNs to be of practical
relevance and maximum usefulness it must be conducted
under realistic conditions, using real users’ data. In par-
ticular, in contrast to other research topics, studying a
simulated OSN may not yield realistic results, especially
if the entire research goal is to analyze and test real users’
data and interactions.
With this paper, we strive to draw attention to this
important issue and initiate a discussion within the OSN
research community to encourage the adoption of an
appropriate code of ethics, which can then be utilized
in agreements and technical standards. This code would
be a means to facilitate good research, with acceptable
trade-offs between ethical considerations and the social
benefits of precise, available, and timely research on
these important issues. As we point out in this work, an
effort from both the research community and industry
is required to define and standardize mechanisms that
will enable this legitimate and significant research while
ensuring privacy of OSN users and their data. A number
of such mechanisms that can facilitate ethical research on
OSNs have been outlined. As online social networks con-
tinue to gain prominence, ethical considerations become
increasingly critical.
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